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THE QUARTERLY SURVEY
A rigorous dissent stated that the majority extended personal
jurisdiction over the foreign corporation "simply because of its
relationship with subsidiary or affiliated corporations of a parent
corporation."3 7  It was argued that the refusal to recognize the
distinctions between validly organized and separately managed
corporations could generally discourage the investment of risk
capital and might lead to reciprocal treatment of American corpora-
tions in foreign countries when jurisdictional questions such as that
facing the Court in the instant case arose. In sum, the dissent
warned, the effect of such an extension of the "doing business"
rule on the "flexibility and promotion of world-wide business enter-
prises would be drastic and unhealthy."38s
Upon examination of the salient facts of the instant case, i.e.,
that the Reservation Service and Hilton (U.K.) were separate and
distinct corporate entities; that the Hilton complex was not used to
defraud, deceive or mislead those who dealt with it; and that the
Reservation Service was not the exclusive agent of Hilton (U.K.),
one must conclude that the result in the Frummer case represents
the most liberal rendering of the doing business doctrine ever
drawn by New York's highest court.
CPLR 302: Substitution of personal representative for deceased
after initiation of action ruled constitutional.
CPLR 302 recites that the courts of New York may exercise
personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary or his executor or
administrator as to a cause of action arising from any of the
enumerated acts in the same manner as if he were a domiciliary.
CPLR 313 provides that an individual subject to the jurisdiction
of the New York courts under CPLR 301 or CPLR 302, or
his executor or adminstrator, may be served with summons with-
out the state in the same manner as service is made within the
state.
In Rosenfeld v. Hotel Corporation of America, 9 the decedent,
a Massachusetts resident, was validly served with process during
his lifetime. He died before the cause of action was tried. Subse-
quent to a stay of the proceedings, the plaintiffs moved to have the
decedent's non-resident executors substituted pursuant to CPLR
1015(a).- ° Substitution was ordered and the executors were per-
sonally served in Massachusetts pursuant to CPLR 313. The
37 Frummer v. Hilton Hotels International, Inc., 19 N.Y.2d 533, 540,
227 N.E.2d 851, 855, 281 N.Y.S.2d 41, 46 (1967).
38 Id. at 543, 227 N.E.2d at 858, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 50.
3020 N.Y.2d 25, 228 N.E.2d 374, 281 N.Y.S.2d 308 (1967).
40 This section provides: "If a party dies and the claim for or against
him is not thereby extinguished the court shall order substitution of the
proper parties."
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defendants appealed the order on the ground that it was uncon-
stitutional to uphold jurisdiction over a non-resident executor,
served without the state, who has not committed any acts or trans-
acted any business in New York.
In affirming the order of the appellate division, the Court of
Appeals noted the clear trend toward constitutional expansion of
the concept of jurisdiction,4 and the express authorization of such
out-of-state service upon non-resident executors contained in CPLR
302 and 313. Accordingly, there could no longer be any constitu-
tional prohibition against the substitution procedure here employed.42
CPLR 302(a)(1), CCA § 404(a): Long-arm statute found inap-
plicable in stock brokerage situation.
Broadly speaking, CPLR 302 (a) (1) provides that the New
York courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-domi-
ciliary, who in person or through an agent transacts any business
within the state. Section 404 of the New York City Civil Court
Act is the equivalent of CPLR 302, except that whereas 302 re-
quires contact with the state, section 404 requires contact with
the City of New York.43
In Hertz, Newmark & Warner v. FischMan,44 the defendant,
a New Jersey domiciliary, bought and sold stock through plaintiff's
Newark office. The Newark office, upon receipt of a buy or sell
order, would contact the main office in New York City, which
would then buy or sell the stock. In this instance, defendant issued
a sell order to the Newark office, but upon completion of the sale
in New York City, he refused to relinquish the certificate to
plaintiff's agent in Newark. Plaintiff was required to purchase
replacement shares, and sued to recover their cost. Defendant's
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction was granted.
The court held that since plaintiff's acts within New York City
did not arise from an exclusive agency with, or employment by,
the defendant, its acts could not be attributed to him for the
purpose of securing personal jurisdiction over the defendant pur-
suant to CCA § 404.45
-4 Citing, of course, McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220
(1957), and International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
42 Rosenfeld v. Hotel Corp. of America, 20 N.Y.2d 25, 228 N.E.2d 374,
281 N.Y.S.2d 308 (1967).
4329A McKINNEY'S N.Y.C. CIVIL COURT Acr § 404, commentary 103-04
(1963). "[Ilf the subject matter is within the court's jurisdiction, and the
contacts enumerated in CCA 404(a)(1-3) were with the city, the court
may, by virtue of subdivision (b), send its summons as far as the supreme
court summons might go if the action had been brought there."
14 53 Misc. 2d 418, 279 N.Y.S.2d 97 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1967).
45Id. at 420-21, 279 N.Y.S.2d at 99-100.
446 [VOL. 42
